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A large body of research indicates that inequality hinders poverty reduction, particularly in the least developed countries (LDCs). Evidence suggests that the more unequal a country's income distribution, the less rapidly its poverty rate falls (World Bank, 2006; Cornia, 2004) . Income disparities also allow economic power to be translated into intensifying social injustice (Sen, 1981) . Many LDCs are rapidly integrating into the global economy via export-based development strategies and liberalizing markets, dramatically altering the conditions under which people construct their livelihoods. LDCs also face increasing exposure to climate variability and higher frequencies of extreme events (IPCC, 2007 ). Yet, how people adapt to economic globalization and environmental uncertainty depends on their initial position in society, since this shapes their livelihood opportunities and ability to influence change (Narayan et al. 2000; Sen, 1999) .
Research has found that poorer inhabitants of LDCs are disproportionally vulnerable to the negative effects of both economic and environmental shocks (Ahmed et al., 2009; Leichenko and O'Brien, 2008; Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2006) . They are more likely to engage in livelihoods that depend on climate-sensitive sectors like agriculture or on lowincome informal or temporary jobs with little protection against climate-related employment disruptions (Cunguara et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2009) . They also tend to have fewer assets or insurance to help them recover from climate shocks and are more likely to live in areas with high exposure to climate variability and extreme events (Carter et al., 2006; Skoufias et al., 2012) . A growing consensus exists within the research literature that poverty makes people more vulnerable to extreme weather events, and that these events exacerbate existing inequalities and power disparities within societies (IPCC, 2014a (IPCC, , 2014b . However, with few 2 exceptions (Grineski et al., 2012) , empirical work on the effects of such events on inequality remains relatively limited, particularly at the sub-national level (Leichenko and Silva, 2014) .
Mozambique provides a particularly useful case for studying the linkages between extreme weather, inequality, and polarization in the context of high poverty and rapid economic change. Seventy percent of the Mozambican population lives in rural areas, which are still largely reliant on rain-fed, semi-subsistence agriculture (INE, 2008) . Mozambican farmers experience high weather vulnerability, with substantial inter-and intra-annual rainfall variability ranging from extreme drought to flooding rainfall from tropical cyclone systems (Arndt, et al., 2010; Matyas & Silva, 2013) . However, a key component of the government's rural development policy involves encouraging smallholders to increase agricultural production for international markets (GOM, 2006 (GOM, , 2011 . The effectiveness of this approach appears questionable given that high levels of economic growth have not decreased rural poverty (Arndt et al., 2012; Cunguara & Hanlon, 2012; Hanlon & Smart, 2008; Geisbert & Schindler, 2012 Using the double exposure framework (Leichenko and O'Brien, 2008) , we examine distributional shifts in income and polarization in the context of concurrent shocks associated with economic globalization and increasing weather variability. During the time period of 3 this study (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) Mozambique experienced multiple weather shocks including extreme rainfall and wind damage from two tropical cyclones, major flooding along the Zambezi River, and drought across the southern regions of the country. These adverse agro-climatic conditions contributed to declines in per capita agricultural production (Arndt et al., 20012) .
Several economic shocks also occurred, most notably dramatic increases in food and fuel prices which peaked in 2008 (Arndt et al., 2012) and contributed to widespread rioting in
February of that year (Hanlon, 2009) . The Mozambican government has continued to promote market liberalization policies , and research in other rapidly globalizing countries has found empirical linkages between increasing trade openness and intensifying economic and social inequities (Li & Wei, 2010; Liao & Wei, 2012) .
In this study, we use the case of Mozambique to test two hypotheses regarding the relationship between inequality and differential climate vulnerability in LDCs based on the conclusions of the latest IPCC report (2014a, 2014b) . First, we hypothesize that regions in Mozambique affected by extreme weather events will experience increasing inequality and polarization due to varying household capacity to mitigate the impacts of these events.
Second, we hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, regions with normal or near-normal rainfall lead to greater income convergence between subsistence farmers and wealthier households that tend to have more formal, non-agricultural sources of income. After examining these hypotheses, we contextualize our findings, with reference to ongoing economic shocks and other factors that may have inequality-altering effects. Thus we investigate changing income distributions, and the dynamics driving these shifts, at the sub-national level to identify how these shifts may be related to extreme weather events in the context of rapid economic change.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Socio-Economic Data and Variable Construction
We use household-level micro-data from the National Agricultural Survey of adjusted incomes to control for household size. All decomposition analyses were carried out using the Distributive Analysis Stata package (Duclos & Abdelkrim, 2007) .
Constructing the Climatology and Grouping Villages by Rainfall Patterns
To examine rainfall, we acquired data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) 3B43 product (Huffman et al., 2007 (Knapp et al., 2010) were plotted in the GIS to identify TCs located within 100 km of Mozambique. Data from the TRMM 3B42 product contain rain rate estimates every three hours at the 0.25° x 0.25° spatial resolution. These data were visually inspected to determine which TCs produced rainfall over Figure 1) .
Figure 1 Weather Groups
Gini Decomposition
To analyze changes in regional inequality, we conduct a decomposition of the Gini index by population subgroups (i.e., our eight weather groups) for 2005 and 2008. The Gini index decomposition equation can be expressed as follows:
Where: I = The Gini index; G = Total population of subgroups g; ϕg = Population share of group g; φg = Income share of group g; Ig = Gini index for group g; Ī = Between-group inequality (when each individual is assumed to have the average income of its group); 8 and R = The residual from overlapping income levels across groups (e.g., overlap inequality).
As presented in equation (1), the Gini index coefficient for the entire sample is comprised of three components: within-group inequality, between-group inequality, and overlap inequality. As described by Abdelkrim (2008) , the contribution of between-group inequality for the full sample is calculated as a function of the differences in group mean incomes, each group's population and income share, and number of groups included in the analysis. Overlap inequality accounts for the degree to which similar income levels are found across the different groupings. The more income levels within the groups resemble one another, the higher the value for overlap inequality. The Gini decomposition method also estimates the magnitude, in both absolute and relative terms, of the contribution of each group to within-group inequality.
DER Polarization Index Decomposition
For our analysis of regional polarization, we use the Duclos, Esteban and Ray (DER) polarization index (Duclos et al. 2004) as it can be decomposed in a manner similar to the Gini index. The DER index accounts for the degree to which similar incomes cluster along an income distribution, as well as the spread between incomes. Thus the examination of polarization complements our analysis of the Gini coefficient. Like the Gini, the DER coefficient values range from 0 to 1, with higher values denoting more polarization.
2 Abdelkrim (2008) illustrates that the DER index can be decomposed as follows:
Where:
Where: G = Total population of subgroups g; ɑ = A normative parameter that expresses the sensitivity of the index to inequality ϵ [.25-1]; ϕ g = Population share of group g; Φ g = Income share of group g; P g = DER index for group g; π g = Local proportion of households belonging to group g and having income x; f(x) 1+ɑ = Density function of income x (i.e., identification effect); f(x) g 1+ɑ = Density function of income x for group g (i.e., identification effect of group g); a g (x) = The absolute distance from income x and other incomes in group g (i.e., alienation effect of group g; equal to the group-level Gini coefficient); dx = Differential distance or spread of income x from the median.
The DER index also measures the magnitude of relative deprivation and surplus income among households within a group. The relative deprivation of a household with income x as compared to that of a household with income y can be expressed as follows:
Where the deprivation of a household with income x is equal to:
And the expected surplus of a household with income x is equal to:
The deficit and surplus components of groups can be estimated as follows:
Where μ= the mean income of the population weighted by the chosen alpha parameter.
If a particular group is composed of a significant proportion of poor households relative to the group mean, the ratio D g /S g will be relatively higher compared to groups with larger concentrations of wealthier households. Using this methodology, changes in polarization can also be analyzed based on the direction of income shifts along the distribution over time.
RESULTS
Regional Groupings by Shared Weather Patterns
Each of our eight weather groups represents a distinct weather pattern over the time period of the study. Figure 2a , 2b, and 2c illustrates the rainfall variability for each group for Seasons 1, 2, and 3, respectively. However, we find that each group can be broadly classified into one of three categories: those experiencing near-normal rainfall, those experiencing a cyclone or flooding event, and those experiencing progressively worsening drought conditions. All groups that experience a form of extreme weather are used to test our first hypothesis. The groups with near-normal weather relate to our second hypothesis. 
Tropical Cyclone and Flood Affected Areas
Group 3 contains locations affected by cyclones (Jaya and Jokwe) in Seasons 2 and 3.
Although Jaya remained offshore, 57 villages received more than 150 mm of rainfall from the event during April, 2007 and rainfall was more than 300% of normal. Jokwe made landfall on 
Progressively Worsening Drought Conditions
Season 1 of our study was a break from the nearly continuous drought experienced in the previous five years (FEWSNET, 2006; Brida et al., 2013 of normal values. The most extreme case of dry conditions over the study period occurred during February in Group 7, with most villages receiving less than 5% of normal rainfall (as compared with 40% and 25%, for Groups 6 and 8, respectively). Polarization, as measured by the DER index, also remains unchanged at 0.314. The polarization estimate, like the Gini coefficient, is very high. For both decomposition analyses, our use of eight groups and the resulting low population share of each group limits the degree to which within-group dynamics alter the coefficients for the full sample.
Decomposition of Gini and DER Indexes for Total Income across Rainfall Clusters
High Variability at the Group-level
The stable Gini and DER coefficients for our full sample mask substantial changes in inequality and polarization within our eight weather groups. These shifts demonstrate a high degree of regional variability during the time period of the study (See Figure 3 , Table 7 ).
With the exception of Group 8, the group rankings for inequality change between years in all cases, indicating a high degree of volatility for inequality at the group level. These shifts are even more pronounced for polarization. Even in cases when group rankings based on absolute values of inequality and polarization remain similar, we still witness substantial differences between years as measured by percentage change in the Gini and DER coefficients, and the D/S ratio. Three distinct patterns emerge in our analysis of regional inequality and polarization among our weather groups (See Figure 4) . In the first scenario, both inequality and polarization increase. In the second scenario, the two measures decrease. These patterns cut across areas that experienced near-normal weather, cyclones and flooding, and progressively worsening drought conditions. Only in one case, Group 8, do inequality and polarization move in different directions. Our results correspond with the findings of Zhang and Kanbur (2001) that shifts in inequality and polarization are highly correlated. In our presentation of the results that follows we focus on the considerable variation between groups in the direction and magnitude of change in inequality and polarization.
Figure 4 Scenarios of Regional Inequality and Polarization
Scenario 1: Increasing Inequality and Polarization
For Groups 1, 5, 6, and 7, incomes become more dispersed from the mean and more concentrated at opposite ends of the distribution. This indicates that the gap between rich and poor households increased, and clusters along the distribution were more sharply defined (e.g., spikier, with higher peaks), particularly along the extreme ends of the distribution. In three of the cases where both inequality and polarization increase, the groups (1, 5, and 6) had the lowest levels for both measures in 2005. Group 1 experiences the greatest increases in inequality and polarization of all groups. The D/S ratio, which roughly measures where the greatest concentration of incomes fall along the distribution relative to the group mean, also experiences the second largest decline (38%). This suggests that incomes became particularly more concentrated towards the lower half of the distribution.
Groups 5 and 6 show an increase in inequality and polarization roughly half that experienced by Group 1. This suggests that the distribution of the groups also became characterised by higher peaks, but the increase was less pronounced. The change in D/S ratio indicates that the proportion of higher-income households increases in Group 6, suggesting income levels shifted towards the upper end of the distribution. In contrast, the change in D/S ratio for Group 5 indicates a higher share of low-income households in 2008, and incomes generally moved lower down the distribution.
In Group 7, inequality slightly increases by 1% but polarization rises more substantially. This indicates that incomes become a little more spread out from the mean, but that clusters of similar incomes along the distribution become much more populated with higher peaks. Despite the small percentage increase in inequality, this group has the second highest Gini coefficient in 2008. The change in D/S ratio suggests an increasing proportion of household incomes situated at the lower end of the distribution.
Scenario 2: Decreasing Inequality and Polarization
Groups 2, 3, and 4 all experience a reduction in both inequality and polarization levels. These groups have less sharply defined clusters of rich and poor households along the distribution in 2008, and incomes converge more towards the mean. In other words, income clusters flatten at the extreme ends of the distribution and resemble wider lumps as opposed to narrow spikes. Group 3 experiences the greatest decrease in inequality and polarization of all groups, followed by Group 2. Group 3 also has the greatest increase its proportion of households clustering in the lower end of the distribution, as measured by the D/S ratio. In 2008, this group has the highest concentration of poor households relative to its mean.
In Groups 2 and 4 the Gini coefficient decreases by similar percentages. However, polarization in Group 2 decreases almost five times more. This suggests that Group 2's distribution is characterized by a greater reduction in the concentration of incomes at the tail ends of the distribution. For both groups, the D/S ratio suggests that incomes shift upward along the distribution, increasing the proportion of relatively wealthier households.
Scenario 3: Decreasing Inequality and Increasing Polarization
Group 8, comprised of villages in southern Maputo Province, is the only area that exhibits opposite trends in inequality and polarization over the time period of the study. 
Distribution Dynamics in the Context of Weather-related Shocks
Contrary to widely-held assumptions in the literature, we no find little evidence to suggest a relationship between initial levels of inequality in a group and the degree or direction of changes in the aftermath of an extreme weather event. The same is true with polarization. This suggests that other factors besides intra-regional economic disparities mediate the effects of weather on income inequality and economic polarization, a finding that is consistent with several empirical case studies that highlight the importance of local collective action and social networks in climate vulnerability and adaptation (Rodima-Taylor, 2012; Scheffran et al., 2012) .
The results of the analysis support our initial hypotheses in five of the eight weather groups. Group 2 experiences near-normal weather and, as expected, incomes converge, becoming more evenly distributed across the income distribution. In four other cases, extreme weather events correspond with increasing distance between incomes and more pronounced concentrations along the distribution. This happens in the Favio-impacted region (Group 5).
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The same pattern is apparent in regions characterized by progressively worsening drought conditions (Groups 6, 7 and 8). Although inequality experiences a very slight reduction for Group 8, the substantial increase in polarization suggests that households in the group had varying abilities to adapt to poor weather conditions. The concurrent economic shocks associated with rapidly rising food and fuel prices most likely compounded weather-related effects on inequality and polarization, as is generally expected. We therefore focus on Groups 1, 3, and 4 in following section, given our findings in these cases lead us to reject our hypotheses, and suggest that standard understandings of the relationship between weather conditions, economic change, and income disparities are incomplete.
To examine whether trends in increasing income inequality and polarization continue for the 2008 and 2012 time period, we conducted Gini and DER decompositions for this period. However, we do not report these table and the results must be interpreted with caution because our eight groups are not unified by similar weather patterns during 2008-2012, a period when two major cyclones, Dando and Funso, made landfall in different regions of the country. 4 We find that Groups 1, 4, 5, and 7 experience further increases in income disparities and polarization, indicating that these trends continue in the short-to medium-term.
In Group 3, income inequality and polarization increase, but remain lower than 2005 levels, suggesting that some households improve their economic position to some degree but not enough to recover from the weather-related shocks associated with cyclones Jaya and Jokwe. The fact that some Group 3 households were affected by tropical cyclones Dando and Funso in 2012 while others were not likely contributes to the reversal in inequality and polarization levels. Households which experienced the additional weather-related shocks would be expected to suffer greater loss of incomes than the others. 
DISCUSSION
Declining Inequality and Polarization in the Aftermath of Weather-related Shocks
Contrary to expectations, inequality and polarization decrease in two regions that experienced extreme weather events. However, the ways in which the income distribution shifts in some areas suggests that decreasing inequality and polarization should not necessarily be interpreted as an indication of better ability to mitigate the effects of extreme weather.
In the case of Group 3 where households were impacted by Jaya and Jokwe, our findings suggest that a widespread increase in poverty drives the convergence in incomes.
Moreover, this shift takes place in an area already characterized by high poverty in 2005.
Several factors contributed to the dramatic decline in incomes. First, households were affected by two cyclones (March 2008 and April 2007) . This had a negative impact on crop yields for two consecutive years since both cyclones occurred during the harvesting period
Crop income accounted for more than 70% of the total income in 2008 for households in Group 3, suggesting high vulnerability to extreme weather events.
Second, Jokwe also disrupted other key economic activities in the area: cashew bean farming and fishing. Jokwe destroyed an estimated two million cashew trees, damaged eight cashew processing plants (Macauhub, 2008; Reliefweb, 2008c) , and damaged numerous fishing boats (Reliefweb, 2008d) . The area also experienced an outbreak of the brown streak virus disease that reduced cassava harvests (FewsNet, 2009) . Given the low initial income levels (even for relatively better-off households), the decrease in inequality and polarization suggest that these series of shocks triggered severe economic setbacks for some households that contributed to or created what Carter et al. (2007) refer to as a poverty trap. Given our findings, it is possible households fell below a minimum asset threshold below which they are unable to invest in human and physical capital and subsequently face significant barriers to lift themselves out of poverty.
We find little evidence that wealthier households in this area were able to better mitigate the negative impacts of a cyclone substantially better than lower-income households, at least in the short term. The TIA data indicate that households in Group 3 did not experience an increase in income share from self-employment activities and salaries despite the fact this area is located in the Nacala Development Corridor (Corredor de Desenvolvimento de Nacala, CDN). The CDN made significant investments in roads, railways and other key infrastructure during the time period of the study, and those investments should theoretically increase more formal employment opportunities in the area.
This suggests that households were generally unable to increase their participation in higherearning, formal activities, and that their inability to do so had inequality-dampening effects.
The and lends some support to the possibility that relatively good labor market access helped some households recover from the floods. Thus, our findings in this specific case correspond to Giesbert and Schindler's (2012) observation that the economic position of households in rural Mozambique are converging, but at near-poverty levels.
Good Weather and Increasing Inequality and Polarization
The finding that Group 1 experienced the largest increases in inequality and polarization goes against our second hypothesis, given that households in this area experienced relatively good weather with rainfall generally near-normal levels for all three years. Increasing reliance on wage income appears to be one inequality-enhancing factor.
TIA data show that the share of wage income to total income was lowest in Group 1 in 2005, but it almost doubled by 2008. The increase in wage income is most likely driven by the these construction project and the recent boom observed in oil and natural gas industries in Cabo
Delgado. However, the poor may not be able to gain from the growth in extractive industries due to very low levels of education or locally-mediated access that privileges more influential households or those belonging to more dominant groups.
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Physical factors may also account for rising inequality and polarization. Households in Group 1 are located in districts of lower altitude and higher temperatures, which means more evapotranspiration and more need for irrigation. However, only 2.7% used irrigation in 2005 (TIA 2005 ). Indeed we find both change in crop income and maize production (per AE, per hectare) to be positively correlated with higher elevations in our sample with r(6683) = .09, p < .01 and r(2134) = .25, p < .01, respectively. In addition, many households in Group 1 experienced drier than normal Novembers for all three years, which could have led to late planting and a subsequent negative impact on yields. The use of improved agricultural technologies is also very low in Group 1 relative to our other study area that received good weather (Group 2). So near-normal rainfall may translate into better crop yields, but limited institutional support (e.g., reduction in the coverage of extension services and access to price information, extremely limited access to credit, and lack of market access) (Cunguara et al. 2013 ) prevent many farmers from benefiting economically.
CONCLUSION
By integrating analytical techniques from climatology and economic geography, we illustrate how mixed-methods and interdisciplinary approaches can improve understandings of weather-related effects on socio-economic outcomes in rural societies. Our study of
Mozambique finds that household groupings unified by similar weather conditions still exhibit very different patterns of changing regional inequality and polarization. Inequality is repeatedly described as a both a consequence and a driver of differential vulnerability to climate-related disasters (IPCC, 2014a (IPCC, , 2014b . The findings for five of our eight weather groups lend some support to this widely held assumption in the literature. In these cases, as hypothesized, incomes in regions with adverse weather conditions experience increasing inequities and more pronounced divisions between rich and poor households. Conversely, 26 good weather can contribute to greater equity and less concentration of wealth and poverty.
Moreover, we find some evidence to suggest that the extreme wet events lead to more enduring patterns on income distributions. By examining underlying dynamics of how the distributions change over time, we find that increasing inequality and polarization can occur as regions gain higher proportions of wealthier households. In other cases, increasing inequities happen as incomes become more concentrated at the lower ends of the distribution.
A preliminary analysis of distributional change over 2008-2012 suggests that these patterns hold in the longer-term, although findings must be interpreted with caution, given that our groups were unified by weather patterns that occurred between 2005-2008 and do not account for subsequent weather shocks.
The results of our analysis of sub-national dynamics in rural Mozambique also indicate that inequality and polarization can decline in the aftermath of an extreme event, and increase even where the weather is relatively good. These patterns all occur in the context of macroeconomic shocks that had similar effects across the country (i.e., increasing food and fuel prices) and are often associated with worsening poverty and exacerbating vulnerability to extreme events. We caution against simplistic interpretations that associate lower levels of inequality and polarization as positive signs of development. If worsening poverty for the majority of households or convergence at near-poverty income levels drives reductions in regional income disparities and polarization, this can also signal an extreme form of vulnerability at both the household and the community level. Both situations could potentially erode social networks and systems of reciprocity, contributing to situations in which communities have limited internal resources to help those most impacted by shocks. In such cases, communities and regions may become increasingly vulnerability and more dependent on external assistance. Taken together, our findings suggest that the adaptive capacity to deal with extreme weather (or the ability to benefit from favorable weather 27 conditions) are greatly influenced by highly localized, contextual factors that merit more detailed attention in future studies of the mechanisms driving regional disparities. 
